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Penalties and Liquidated Damages
with Special Reference to the Law in New York.
It is almost impossible to formulate a single
criterion to determine the question of a penalty or liqui-
dated damages in every case; yet thc-e hs been certain rules
established by decisions, which may be a-:i-od to different
forms of arguments, yet there are of course many instances
which can not be brought y~ithin their operation.
If the contract is for a :..atter of certain value
and a certain amount is to bc paid in broach of it vi>±ch is
in the excess of that &ount, then and in th-t case the sum
which is so fixed is t, be rez<%A> as a l.nalt- and not as
liquidaate ,. 27=Zes. Th-i-c on rhce other ha"', if the contract
is for -_ natter of uncertain value and an az:ount is fixed to
be a nc1 of the se -o, the ,u; is recovered 14 -
quidated dnftts.
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There are some rules which have been established
by judicial authority which -:uiii i.;7v" be tak.en up and fully
discussed in every i.articrilar.
TIPRT. Then tho payment of -u smaller anount of money
is secured by a larger tthe -aout theno contracted for
can under no circiumstance whatever be treated as liquidated
damages, but must in every ca.e always be treated as a penalty.
Pomeroy's 1(q. Jur., Vol. I.,Sec. 4$1. It is competent for
all parties to a coitract for the purchase or sale of real
property to liquidate and settle by agreement among themdelve4
the amount of damages which one party is to pay to the other
upon a breach of the contract, instead of leaving such amount
to be ascortaine,. by 2 court or jury. Since injuries re-
sulting from a breach are uncertain in a:ount, as they are
in every case other than when the contract is to pay, the
parties usually have the right to say how amuch shall be paid
by way of compensation to the injure-_. and when they have
settled that amount, neither a court of equity or a court of
law will diminish its amount unless it e so in excess of the
actual injury that a fair ,inded man would start at the bare
mention of it. The courts are not authorized to make a
new contract for tho rarties, or unma"zc the one made by them,
and hold, from the circiurwtancos of the situation and the
nature of the transaction, that the rartics to the transaction
intended anything different from what they expressed. Vrhen
the yarties to a contract, in w.hich the amount of damfages is
to be ascertained, coring from a breaci of a contract, is un-
certain in amount, agrec that a certain amount shall be the
damages in case of failure to rerform the same, and in lan-
guage plainly ex-ressive of an agreement I lznow of no prin-
ciple or sound rule of law ap-Ilicable to the construction of
contracts which will enable a court of law to say that they
intended something else. Where the sum fixed is greatly
disproportionate to the prc7sumed actual damage, probably a
court of equity may relieve; but a court of law has no right
to erroneously construe the intention of the parties to a
contract, when it is clearly expressed, in the endeavor to
make a better contract for them than they have actually made
for themselvos. In all cases, however, it is the duty of
the courts to find out what the true intent of the parties
is and then to carry it into effect. It is true that a
cause may arise in which it is doubtful from the language
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which is emprloyed in the origi±~il instrument, whether the
parties to the contract meant to agree upon the measure of
compensation to the injure2 y arty in ca-e of a breach. In
such cases there would. be room for construction; but certainly
none when the meaning of the parties was evident and urunis-
takable. When they declare, in distinct and unequivocal
terms, that they have settled and fixed the damages to be a
certain amount, or any other sum to be paid by either failing
to perform it seems wron: for a court to tell them that they
have looiked into the contract and reached the conclusion that
it was not the thing which was intonded; but that the in-
tention was to name the sum as a penalty to cover any damages
that might be -roved to have been sustained by a breach of
the agreement.
Certain rules have been established that are suppos-
ed to control the construction ,f contracts although in the
view of some it has been difficult, if not impossible, to
support an agreement for liquidated damages in cases where
the amount ascertained by the piarties seera cis- ro-ortionate
to the conjectured actual damage@.
There such damages as are stipulatcd in the gross
amount fixed by the terms of the contract for failurd to
perform the same, is in the nature of a penalty, or ;,.st be
adjudged as liquidated cdan~ag s, can only be determined by
ascertaining. the into'ction of the parties, as gathered both
from the language of the contract and from the nature and cir-
cumstances of the case. Unless the intent of the parties
is very clearly expresscd the forfeiture named for non-ful-
fillment of a contract, when excessive, will not be con-
strue. as intended to be -qui-ated damages. Colnell vs.
Lawrence et al, 38 I.Y., 71.
"he--e a s :s specJ'icaliy named in a written
agreement "as liquidate-f damages," in case either party
shou-.-d fail to perform the contract rmst, nevertheless, be
construed as a penalty, when, upon the face of the instrument,
it appears that such sum will necessarily be an inadequate
compensation for the breach of some of the provisions and
more than enough for the breach of others. This propo-
sition is sustained by rnimerous authorities :ot only in New
York. but in other states.
Thus we see in Bagley vs. Peddu, 16 T.Y., 469,
where a bond declared the obligors to be bound ,in the sum of
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$3000 as liquidated damagc, and not by way of penalty or
otherwise," for the p-rformance of the c-.,venants in a written
agreement. None of the covenant! was for the payment of
money, or for the icing or omitting of any act the damages
resulting from which could be computed from data furn ished by
the instrument itself; but the damages for -any breach were
uncertain and required evidence aliundi the instrument to
establish their amount. One of the covenants was not to
reveal the secrets of trade in which the priilcilal obligor
w..s to be employed, or any invertion or improvement that might
be made by his e-&:rloyment, the obliee. IELD, that a breach
of this covenant involved da.iages so uncertain and difficult
to be ascertained, as that the sum n-amed should be Jeemcd not
a penalty but liquidated damages, recoverable upon a breach of
any of the covenants, although the damages from the actual
breach might be readily determined by a jury.
7Then it is doiibtful whether the siLm inserted was
intended ?s a ipenalty or as liquidated dama-es, it vi*l be
considered in the nature of a penalty, especially if the pay-
ment of a certain damage less than the whole sum is provided
for by the instrument; but where the sum aw-plles as well to
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stipulations where the cfz.ages, in case of broach necessarily
must be uncertain, as to stipulations where the dsmagos
would be certain, it v.'ill be reoaraed as liqui'ate. damages
and not as a penalty.
SLCCND. '.7hon the agreement is for the -erf'ormance or
non-performance of only one act, and there is no adequate mea
means of ascertininZ the reeise damages w.hich may result
from a violation, the parties may, if they please, by a sep-
arate clause of the contr.ct, fix u: -. the amount of compen-
sation payable by the defaulting party in case of a broach
and a stipulation inserted. for sIuch ,u--ose will be treated a
as one for "liquidated danages," unless the intent be clear
that it was designed to be only a penalty. Pomeroy's Eq.
Jur., Vol. I., SoC. 442.
There are variuus legal rules for ascertaining
whether a sxz naned in a contr-act, to be raid by a default-
ing -arty, was intender as liquidated agos or a -enalty
merely. Among these rules is one well establclhed by numer-
ous decisions, that when a contract is such that the damages,
in case of a violation of it, will be uncertain in their na-
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ture and amount, and the parties have stipulated that in the
event of a breach a certain siun shall be paid b, the rarty
in default, as liquidated dwI:ages, they vill be regarded as
having =o intended and that sum will be treated as the measure
of damages.
In the case of Smith et al vs. Coo, 33 !.Y.qup.Ct.,
481. In an action brought u;ion an alleged breach of a
covenant in a sealed lease, wherein the defendant covenanted
that ie would not at a-Ly time before June 186, negotiate for,
or accet, or be interest,-d in 1n- le-ce of certain -remises
except from the :laintiff, under a forfeiture of ten thousand
dollars, to be paid liquidated domaes and not as a penalty,-
HELD, that the only question for the Jury to decide was as to
a breach of the covenant, as set forth in the lease, and if
they found that the defendant had violated the covenant then
they must also find a verdict for da-magcs of ten thousand
dollars in !savor of plaintiff according to the stipulation in
the covenant.
THIRD. ;1oere t. IO re(ment contains :rovisions for the
rerformance or non-etformance of acts which are not measur-
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able by any exact pecuniary standard, and also of one or more
other acts in respect of which the damages are easily ascer-
tainable by a jury, and a certain sun is stipulated to be
paid upon a violation of any or all of these provisions, such
sum must be taken to be a penalty. Pomeroy's 1]q.Jur., Vol.
I., Sec. 445.
W1here a party agrees to do several things, one of
which is to pay a certain sum of money, and in case of a
failure to rerform any or ei'her of t7e stipulations, agrees
to pay a larger sum as liquidated damages, the larger sum
is to be regarded in the nature of a penalty and being a pen-
alty in regard to one of the stipulations to be performed,
is a penalty as to all. "To the same effect are the case.-
Clement vs. Cash, 21 N.Y., 253, 259; Bagley vs. Peddei,
16 N.Y., 410.
FOUl TV1. This rule plainly rests upon the same grounds
as the third, and may be considered a particular aplication
thereof. Pomeroy's Eq.Jur., Vol. I., Sec. 444.
In the case of Lampman vs. Cockrani, 16 N.Y., 275,
the head not reads as follows: A sum specifically named in
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a written agreement "as liquidated damages" in case either
party should fail to 'erform the contract, must, nevertheless,
be construed as a penalty, when, upon the face of the instru-
ment, it appears that suc. sum Ywill necessarily be an inad-
equate compensation for the breach of some of the provisions
and more than enough for the breach of others. A contract
provided, among other things, that one -f the -arties should
give to the other, on a speciffied day, a -romissory note for
$200, and on a subsequent day a bond and mortgage for $2000
with interest, and the -arties agreed therein "to pay one to
the other the sum of 2500, as liquidated domages," upon fail-
ure to perform the contract; HELD, that the sum mentioned is
to be regarded as having been wrongly named by the parties,
and as being in fact a penalty.
FIFTH. Although :. agreement may contain two or more
provisions for the doing or not doing different acts still
where the stipulation to pay a certain sum of money upon a
default, a-taches to only one of these provisions, vhich is
of such a nature that there is no c rtain means of ascertain-
ing the amount of damages resulting from its violation, or
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where all of the provisioK s are of' such -a nature that the
damages occasioned by their breach cannot be measured, and
a certain s'nm is made .-ayable ut-on a default gunerally in
any of them; in each of there cases the sxnn so agrcd to be
paid may be considered as liquidated damages, provided, of
course, that the language of thc stipulation does not bring
it within the limitation of the preceeding fourth rule. It
is evident that this proposition, in both its branches, is
identical in substance with the second rule heretofore given
and rests upon exactly the s --mc grounds. Thc foregogin rules
may be considere-f as settled by the strong prepondcrance of
judicial authority and they serve to explain large and impor-
tant classes of cases. There are undoubtedly -imerous in-
stances which cannot be easily referred to eith of these
rules; and this must be so alrMost as a matter of necessity.
Since agreements are of indefinite variety in their objects
and in their provisions, and since the question of lpenalty or
liquidated damages is always one of intention, depending upon
the terms and circumstances of each particuiar contract, there
mist -,e many agreements which cannot be brought within the
scope of any specific rule, and vith 1rich a court can only
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deal by arl-ying the 1:iost general ca !on of inter-fretation.
Pomeroy's 1'q. Jur., Vol. I., Sec. 445.
It is true the courts In neirly all the cases pro-
fess to be construing the contract with reference to the in-
tention of the parties, as if for the rurpose of ascertaining
and Ziving effect to that intention; yet it is obvious from
the cases, that wherever it haF ayeareK to the court from
the face of the contract and the subject natter, that the
sum was clearly too large for just co v-rennation, here, while
they will allow any form of w-ords, even those expressing the
direct contrary to iradicate the intent to mahe it a penalty;
yet no form of words, no force of language is competent to the
expression of the opposite intent. Here then is an intention
incaable of expression in words: @and as all written contracts
must be exrressed in ,Tor.s, it would seen to be a mere waste
of time and effort to lool for such an intention in such a
conth-act. And as the question is between two oposite in-
tents only, and the negation of one necessarily implies the
existence of the other, there woul' soem to be no room left
for construction with reference to the intent.
But some of the cases attempt to justify this mode
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of construing the cont'r .ct with reference to the intent by
declaring in substance, that though the language is the stron-
gest which could be used to evince the intention in favor of
stipulated damages, still, if it clearly a-ear by reference
to the subject matter that the yarties have made the stipu-
lation without r ference to the princirlle of just compen-ation
and so excessive as to be out of all rrowortion to the actual
damage, the court must hold that they coulz. not have intended
it as stipulated damages, though they have so expressly de-
clared. Now this, it is true, may lead to the same result
in the particular case as to have placed the decision upon
the true ground, Viz.- that thnoug the yarties actually in-
tended the sum to be -aid as the damages agreed between them,
yet it being clearl> inconscionable, the court would disre-
Zard the intention and refuse to enforce the stipulation.
But as a rule of construction or interpretation of contracts,
it is radically vicious and tends to a confusion of ideas in
construction of contracts generally. It is this, more than
anything else, which haf introduced so much ap-arent conflict
in the decisions upon this whole subject of penalty and stip-
ulated damages. It sets at defiance all rules of intcrpre-
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tation by denying the intention of the larties to be what they
in the most uncm' iguous terms, have declar(d it to be and
finds an intention directly o1:osite to that which is clearly
exTpressed. Again, the attempt to place this question upon
the intention of the parties, and to maze this the governing
consideration, necessarily imnilies t'at, if the intention to
make the s=, stirulated damages shoul. clearly ap-,car, the
court would enforce the cont-act arcording to that intention.
To test this, let it be asked whether, in such a case, if it
were admitted that the rarties actually intended the sum to
be considered as stipulated damages, and riot as a penalty,
would a court of law enforce it for the amount stipulated?
Clearly, they could not, without going back to the technical
and long exploded doctrine which gave the whole penalty of
the bond, without reference to the damages actually sustained.
They would thus be simply changing tife manner of things and
enforcing, under t'.e name of stipulated damages, whit in its
nature is but a penalty. The real question in this class
of cases will be founded, but whether the sum is, in fact, in
in the natnre of a renalty; and this is to be determined by
the magnitude of the sum, in connection v.ith the subject
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matter, and not at all by the worcds or - ... crstanding of the
parties. The intcntion of the -.artie cannot alter it.
7hile the courts of la,:: g-e the penalty 3f the
bond, the yarties intended the "-ayment of te -enalty as such
and did not inten- the rayment of stdam.1at.. dmages. It
must, the~-'efore, ' ir, be very obvi;,i that te actual in-
tention of the -artie- in this class of cases, and relating to
this ioint, is vholly immJterial; an- t'no '---. the courts have
very generally professed to base their decisions upon the
intention of the parties, that i:tontion ;s :not and cannot be
made the real basis of their ecisions. In endeavoring to
reconcile their decisions with the actual intention of the
parties, the courts have sometimes beeo compelled to use
language wholly at wr, with any idea of interpretation and
to say "that the partics mst be considcred. as not meaning
exactly what they say." Layr it not be said, with at least
equal propriety, that courts have sometimes said what they
did not exactly men: The foregoing remarks are all to be
confined to that class of cases where it :as cler, from the
sum mentioned. and the subjctc matter, -.hat the -1rinciple of
compensation h ' beoe di -rezari.
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The distinction between a enalty for securing the
yerformancc of the contract, and a stirullation vwhich makes -a
part of the contract itself, may be illust-ated by the rule
that if a certain rate of interest is cecured in a mortgage,
with an agreemen-t that if it be -ot A-id -runctually the rate
shall be increase-', tle larger interest is in the nature of a
penalty and may be relicved against in equity. But on the
other hand, if the larger rate be origiually reserved, with
an agreement for reiuetion on punctual payment, the condition
for such punctual pay-aent is -art of the contract and relief
cannot be given if it is -not fulfilled.
In the case of Crishe vs. Bolton, 3 Car.& P., 240,
Best C.J., says: "That parties to contracts, from znowing
exactly their own intention and objects, can better appreciate
the consequences of their f .ling to obtain those objects
than either ju-dges or juries; and that -f a contract clearly
state ,Vhat shall be -aid by the -1arty who brao[s it to the
party to wh.ose -reJudice it is brohen, the verdict in an
action for the breach should. be for the stirpulated sum; that
a court of justice has no more authcrity to rut a different
construction on the part of the invtrniment ascertaining the
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the amount of dara-es than it has to decic contrary to any
other of its clauses. It is conccce o by all that courts are
to be governel by the intention of the rarties, to be gathered
from the language of the contract anmd from the nature and
circumstances of the ca-c.
"Then there is a cont-.ct to Iay money, the damages
for its breach are fixed ar.7 lquidat o by law, and require
no liquidation by the parties. An aroement to ,ay greater
damages is therefore re-arded as a renalty. But when the
damages rcsulting from the breach are uncertain in amount,
as they are in all other cases, the -arties have the right to
say how much shall be -aid by way of compensation to the -arty
injured; and when they have settled that comr.ensation, neither
a court of lav*nor a court of equity vwill diminish its amount,
unless it be so -rossly dispr'o-.ortionatc to the actual injury
that a man would start at the bare mention of it.
,Tere there is a manifest aifficnlt- in ascertaining
damages arising from the breac. of the contract, and the fair
conclusion is th-lt the amount is sIecificfL and agreed on for
the -urrose of savin- the ex-ense or avoiding the difficulty
of proving the actual -amages, the yarties should be held to
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their bar-ain; and e.r-ecialiy -. e the amount fixe and
liquidate-! iF not far beyond v.hat might Iroperly be exp-ected
to arise from a breach of the contract.
.here the parties to a contract sti-ulate for a pay-
ment in liquidation of damages by a -,arty in default, if the
damages are in their inature uncertain aa. incapable of exact
ascertainment, and may be deyendent uron extrinsic consider-
ation and circumstances, and the amount is not, on the face
of the contract, out of all Froportion to the j-obable loss,
it will be treated as liquidated dmanages.
The fact that the sum so s-roed to be -aid is trmed
by the rarties a"Ienalt':" is not controlling ulon the
questior of construction. it seems, hovcver, that uvhen the
stipulatec sum is disTproyortionate to the presumed or Probable
damages, or to a reai-ily -ascertainable loss, the courts will
treat it as a renalty anf', vAil relieve on the crinciple that
the precise sum wo.s -not the essence of the agreeme.t, but was
in the nature of security for performance.
Plaintiff contracted to erect certain oIses for
defendant; the contract yrovided that in case of default in
the comyletion of the vo1z by a certain date, plaintiff,
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"the contractor, shall ray to the ovmer ten dollars for e 'ery
day thereafter that the said ;:o- L shall remain unfinished, as
and for liqi&,ted damages." Pl-intiff fail o t- -crform
within the stipulated time, and some time after his default
the parties entered into a new -emcnt, which, after recit-
ing the original contract, the failure to yarform, the desire
of the contractor for au: extension of time, and to avoid the
payment of the "renalty", and after specifying what was to be
done to entitle plaintiff to a waiver of his default, contain-
ed the agreement "that the sum or renalty" due under said
contract "shall be l1,E40, by way of liquidated damages,"
unless the worh is coinieted by a day r:ced. The worh not
having been completed on the day nanel, the Iartios entered
into another agreement which recited the breach and a claim
on the rart of the rlaintiff that the "penalty" should not
be exacted, as his :dcfault I;.7as excusable, "being caused by
an act of God," that is, by a severe storm. The rarties
agreed thereby to a settlement of all other matter, "except
the one question of penalty" leaving that for liti,-ation
in case -laintiff chose to Iltigate the s ame. in an action
brought to determine laintifT's liability to ray the sum
-20-
s t . ato-., o, tL. cu: Cixc , the orii:L-ti contract
was by .ay of I-quid0.te -'a-e-, -ot . renalty; U -atlai -
tiff's default was not waivcd by tIe seconda contract, but,
on the cont..ary, recon e his labilt therefor.
Also, that as the ay'e''ue:, t of :1al-tif .- v absolute
and no rrovision .",as ..... e theUei , 1a'ast the result of
interference with its ife-formance by an occurrence unforeseen
any b(,-. -n lintiff' 3or.trol, such -a2, oco,,'rr ce ;as :wo
available as a defense. (Head ore :f 77ard vs. K.R.B.Co.,
125 N.Y., 230-1.).
C 0 I C L U S I 0 N .
The author's object in taking this vast and com-
rlicated subject was to ascerta.in wrether a -articular case,
which he has, comes under the head of a Penalty or Liqui-
dated Damages; he has carefully and flit lfully examined the
rules and authorities a"7.1 cable thereto and has come to
the final conclusion, that no definite rules can be given
to ascertain under which head a case comes, and many times
it is impossible to tell until the court of last resort has
passed uron it.
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Attorney S- Counsellor at Uv4
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